

## RATIONALITY, GENDER, AND HISTORY

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The history of western philosophy includes three basic traditions concerning the relation of rationality to gender which can be identified as sex unity, sex polarity, and sex complementarity. These traditions are not time bound, but rather crossed millennia through which they became reformulated in progressively more sophisticated form. These traditions are also not tightly defined, but rather include many different philosophers who thought about rationality and gender, and who elaborated various theories about this subject without necessarily adverting to the original articulation of the theory.<sup>1</sup>

What marks the separate roots of the three traditions is a different premise about the relation of rationality to gender, and this premise in each tradition has a link to a second premise about the identity and relation of the faculties of the soul to the body. The sex unity tradition devalues the body in relation to the soul, and concludes that the faculties and their exercise in women and men are the same and that gender is irrelevant to rationality. The sex polarity tradition argues for an integration of soul and body, but devalues the exercise of the rational faculties in one sex. The sex complementarity tradition argues for an integration of soul and body, but suggests an equality in the exercise of the faculties in men and women with a concomitant difference in some components in the exercise of these faculties. It concludes with a theory that men and women are equal in the capacity to exercise rationality but differ in some respects in the data that they incorporate in this exercise.

Let us assume that there are two basic components to human rationality: capacities (included in the faculty of intellect) and data of consciousness (including lived experience of the

female or male body, socialization in masculine and feminine cultural characteristics as woman or man incorporating personal experience, history, language, stereotypes, archetypes and so forth). The three basic theories of sex and gender identity may be differentiated depending on how they interpret the significance of the two variables: rational capacities and data of consciousness.

More specifically, sex unity theorists argue that the capacities of men and women are identical and that different data of consciousness are not philosophically significant. Sex polarity theorists argue that both the capacities and data of consciousness of men and women are significantly different. In its traditional form, male capacities and data of consciousness were given the higher valuation, while in its contemporary reverse sex polarity form, female capacities and data of consciousness are given the higher valuation. Sex complementarity theorists argue that the capacities for rationality are identical in men and women, but that there is a "band of data" of male consciousness that differs significantly from an analogous band of data of female consciousness. They conclude that although there is a common band of data of consciousness that women and men share by virtue of other factors, such as their shared human experience or their common experience of race, religion, class, domicile, vocation, and so forth, a particular kind of complementarity in their exercise of rationality occurs through their sex and gender differentiated data of consciousness.

Today when "women acquire in the world an influence, an effect and a power never hitherto achieved," the devaluation of woman's rationality so central to traditional sex polarity, has been thrown into what Alasdair MacIntyre calls an "epistemological crisis."<sup>2</sup> Contemporary responses to this epistemological crisis have taken the form of an affirmation of a sex unity

theory derived from neo-Platonic or Cartesian traditions or the affirmation of a reverse sex polarity theory derived from positing a priority to women's experience. In this paper I would like to argue for a third alternative, or for the development of a theory of integral sex complementarity. In this way, the 'epistemological crisis' precipitated by women's development offers the possibility of a reformulation of a new philosophical foundation of a theory of rationality and gender through what MacIntyre calls "genuine intellectual encounters" and "participation in rational practice-based communities."<sup>3</sup> To build this argument, the histories and basic premises of each of the three fundamental theories of sex and gender identity will now be considered in turn.

### Sex Polarity Theories

The first thorough articulation of the theory that there are significant differences in the exercise of rationality in men and in women is found in Aristotle's *Politics*. Arguing that "the parts of the soul are present...in different degrees" in men and women, Aristotle concludes that the woman has a deliberative faculty, but that it is "without authority" in her soul.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, woman's rationality is weakly exercised and is under the sway of her irrational passions. Woman is thought to be naturally inferior to man through an imperfection in the formation of her bodily composition. In the Aristotelian tradition, the integration of soul and body is an essential premise. Therefore, since the imperfect formation of woman's body influences a corresponding imperfect development of her mind, the virtue of her rational faculty is to simply adhere to true opinion, rather than to practice theoretical and practical syllogisms.

This Aristotelian interpretation of the relation of rationality and gender has led some feminist philosophers to the extreme conclusion that for Aristotle "woman is not a rational animal."<sup>5</sup>

Another version of the Aristotelian model of sex polarity is repeated by St. Albert the Great who frequently refers to woman's "intellectual weakness" and "inconstant ideas."<sup>6</sup> Similarly St. Thomas argues: "...the power of rational discernment is by nature stronger in man."<sup>7</sup> He distinguishes between the gift of wisdom which brings infused knowledge from above from the exercise of the intellectual virtue and concludes that although women have the former as much as do men, they are weak in the philosophical exercise of rationality.<sup>8</sup> For St. Thomas, the weakness in nature may be overcome through grace. The Aristotelian description of woman's naturally inferior rationality was integrated into academic thought by the thirteenth century at Paris, Oxford, and the many other universities founded in Europe at the time. The devaluation of woman's rationality within this tradition is captured in the following statement by Giles of Rome: "woman's advice is of little value, for, by nature, she has a defect in reason and understanding because her body is poorly formed."<sup>9</sup>

Genevieve Lloyd states that: "The associations between 'male' and 'rational' and between 'female' and 'non-rational' have...a very long history."<sup>10</sup> Tracing this association from ancient Greek philosophy to the present, she notices a difference from early formulations in which contrasts between male and female were made within the rational, so that the female, while having less rational capacity than the male nonetheless participated in rationality. In contrast to this, in later post-Cartesian formulations the female appeared almost to be excluded from rationality. This shift followed upon a change in the conception of rationality from the inner dynamics of activities within the soul in ancient and medieval philosophy to an emphasis upon

a method of reasoning in modern philosophy. In the former traditional of rationality women were included but devalued, while in the latter they were both devalued and excluded.<sup>11</sup>

Lorraine Code notes that "The mind/body, culture/nature, reason/passion dichotomies that inform the construction of rationality as a regulative ideal parallel the male/female dichotomy, both descriptively and evaluatively. In each pair, the second term (body, nature, passion, and female) is accorded lesser value and stands for the less controllable member."<sup>12</sup> Jean Jacques Rousseau delineated women's 'rationality' as focusing primarily on the emotions, on practical decisions in the present, and on the general categories of taste, sentiments, and the senses, while men's focus is on ideas and arguments, abstract judgments, and planning for the future.<sup>13</sup> Immanuel Kant argued that woman's "philosophy is not to reason, but to sense."<sup>14</sup> Then following in this tradition Schopenhauer claimed that women were limited to a childlike exercise of rationality that was tied to the concrete present, while men participated in the full range of rational activity.<sup>15</sup> There are many other philosophers such as Kierkegaard or Hegel who made similar sex polarity arguments.<sup>16</sup> In another, more recent example, Otto Weininger's *Sex and Character* contained the sex polarity claim: "With the woman, thinking and feeling are identical, for man they are in opposition."<sup>17</sup>

A second kind of rational tradition, or reverse sex polarity, developed in reaction against sex polarity. In this theory, woman is described as significantly different from and superior to man. The first formulation of this argument was found in the Renaissance Humanist theologian Agrippa who argued that woman is superior to man in order of creation, material composition, intellect, power of speech, and virtue.<sup>18</sup> Lucrezia Marinelli developed her own justification of this theory through philosophical and historical arguments, that women have demonstrated a

superiority over men in the practice of Aristotelian virtue, and men have demonstrated an inferiority to women in the practice of vices.<sup>19</sup>

The view that women's rationality is significantly different from and superior to men has been recently defended by many feminists. Their arguments take many forms, but they usually accept the association of a masculine rationality with discursive reasoning, and a feminine rationality with the senses, emotions, lower forms of intuition, and imagination. Then they give a preferential weighting to these so-called 'feminine' forms of rationality. These cluster of arguments form a new field which they have identified as "feminist epistemology."<sup>20</sup> There are two primary places of re-emphasis: privileging the emotions and privileging inter-subjective relations. In the first example, feminist philosophers such as Alison Jaggar, emphasize the important role of emotions or feelings in making rational judgments.<sup>21</sup> The claim of Lorraine Code that female connectedness is superior to male autonomy is found in a slightly different form in Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice* in which women's moral reasoning, based on a premise of concrete caring, is preferred to men's moral reasoning based on a premise of abstract justice.<sup>22</sup> The question of the relation of gender to different theories of justice is now central to many feminist debates.<sup>23</sup>

We will now turn to the second mentioned rational tradition, or sex unity, to examine its roots and premises.

### Sex Unity Theories

Plato postulated that women and men had the same natures, that some members of both genders were lovers of wisdom, and that they ought to be developed by equal training.<sup>24</sup> His

broader theory involved the claim that the sexless soul existed independently of the body and entered variously male or female bodies in different reincarnations.<sup>25</sup> By the exercise of the rational powers, through the study of philosophy and an apprehension of progressively higher Forms, a man or a woman could equally achieve perfection.<sup>26</sup> A Platonic rejection of the body was repeated by the neo-Platonist Porphyry to his wife Marcella when he encouraged her to "flee all that is womanish in thy soul" and to take up the study of philosophy.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, we can say that in these early articulations of the sex unity tradition both the structure and content of rationality were the same for men and for women because a particular gendered body was thought to be an unimportant aspect of human identity.

The next augmentation of the sex unity tradition occurred as a result of a "Cartesian" reformation in arguments about gender identity which particularly influenced Protestant Christian thinkers. Following the model of Descartes, Maria von Schurman argued, using a series of syllogisms, that the form of woman, or the rational soul, proved that a woman could be a scholar as much as a man.<sup>28</sup> Another Protestant Cartesian Poullain de la Barre argued that rationality was exactly the same for men and women because it constituted primarily a method of reasoning and because women's and men's minds were sexless. He concluded: "In effect, we All (both Men and Women) have the same Right to Truth, since the Mind in all of us is alike capable to know it; and that we are (All) affected in the same manner, by the Objects that make Impression upon the Body."<sup>29</sup> The claim that reason is sexless, and that there is an equality of mind shared by all rational beings, became a shared assumption of Cartesian sex unity theorists. These philosophers became known as "Cartesian Feminists" or "Reason's Disciples."<sup>30</sup>

History and custom were identified as liabilities in the struggle to articulate a proper philosophy. As Mary Astell expressed it: "Custom cannot Authorise a Practice if Reason Condemns it."<sup>31</sup> In fact, the rejection of tradition is a common characteristic of sex unity theorists. The political embodiment of these views was found in the French Revolution and the attack on custom. A sex unity theory was employed to overturn perceived injustices from the tradition of sex polarity. Olympe de Gouges argued that the "limits ['of male tyranny'] are to be reformed by the laws of nature and reason" and she appealed to women to "courageously oppose the force of reason to the empty pretensions of superiority; unity yourself beneath the standards of philosophy."<sup>32</sup> Mary Wollstonecraft appealed to the "parity of reason" which women share with men as a basis to include women as citizens in the new French Constitution.<sup>33</sup> Condorcet argued in a similar way in relation to the American Revolution that "from the moment that there exists a sensitive being, able to reason and have moral ideas" that rights of citizenship follow, and he concluded that women ought to be able to exercise the right of American citizenship.<sup>34</sup>

The view that Cartesianism provided the new philosophical foundations for a sex unity theory has recently been criticized by some feminist philosophers who argue that Cartesianism is primarily a masculine, rather than gender neutral, model of rationality. Citing the ideal of independence and autonomy as found in the Cartesian method, Lorainne Code is highly critical of what she calls "malestream [sic.] philosophical methodology [which] is shaped, nonetheless, by an adversarial paradigm defined in terms of rational autonomy and defensiveness."<sup>35</sup> A further criticism of the tradition that associates rationality with sex polarity is found in the recent work of Susan Bordo who argues that Cartesianism is not properly understood as laying the



philosophical foundation for a non-differentiation of man's and woman's rationality, but rather for a masculine rationality. In "The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought" and *The Flight to Objectivity* Bordo argues that Descartes conception of rationality as objective and autonomous is not gender neutral, but rather is masculine.<sup>36</sup> Further it partakes of a rejection of the devaluation found in the feminine association with materiality in its different forms. Bordo concludes that a reverse theory which values feminine epistemology as superior to the masculine should be recognized as a reaction against the Cartesian past. Her argument claims that Cartesianism is actually a sex polarity theory, and her preference is for a form of reverse sex polarity. She states: "If a 'flight from the feminine,'... motivated the birth of the Cartesian ideals, the contemporary revaluation of the feminine has much to contribute to the world that will replace them."<sup>37</sup>

Janet Radcliffe Richards has criticized these preferences of radical feminists for a reverse sex polarity in 'women's ways of knowing' as the "pursuit of unreason" or a "thoroughgoing "anti-rationalism." She eschews claims for a natural superiority of women's experience, intuitions, imagination, and feelings over what they consider man's rational capacities for discursive reasoning.<sup>38</sup> Richards notes a paradox in their attempts to separate intuition from reason and their arguments to defend the superiority of women's intuition. She concludes: "it is no good trying to use arguments of this sort as a defence of irrationality, because to the extent that intuition can be defended, that defence stems from reason."<sup>39</sup>

If we return to a consideration of the original impact of Cartesianism on sex arguments because of an emphasis on the equality of rational capacities, and a devaluation of body and differences in data of consciousness, we can identify the ways in which sex unity theorists seek

to get rid of all empirical residue of differences. So while the Aristotelian tradition defended an integration of soul and body, but devalued woman, the Platonic and Cartesian tradition defended an equality of men and women, but devalued the body.

### Sex Complementarity Theories

Hildegard of Bingen, a twelfth century Benedictine Abbess, was the first Christian thinker to develop a philosophical foundations for a theory that men and women were both equal and significantly different with respect to their exercise of the rational capacities. Drawing upon a medieval science of humours and elements, she argued that the presence of the female element, air, in either sex tempered the passions. She concluded that women and men could both exercise rationality with self-control. She described an admirable kind of men whose wisdom "takes its beautiful self-control out of the female element: for they are in possession of a sensible understanding."<sup>40</sup> Men and women had a similar structure of soul, but some of the content could be significantly different because of differences in bodily constitution and consequent differences in consciousness. In some ways Hildegard's theory anticipates the claim of phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty, that the lived experience of the body is a significant factor in self identity.<sup>41</sup>

If we consider the tradition of several women writers from the twelfth to seventeenth centuries, we find that many of them articulated a theory which included reference to the exercise of discursive reason to gain self-knowledge, self-governance, and practical action. For example, Hadewijch wrote about the dialectic of reason and love, and she personified reason as

a surgeon and queen.<sup>42</sup> Mechtild wrote a dialogue concerning the relation of the understanding, the senses, wisdom, and public speech.<sup>43</sup> Bridget of Sweden developed a method of questioning about the relation of free will, intellect, and the senses.<sup>44</sup> Julian of Norwich wrote a dialogue about the relation of soul and body, substance and sensuality, and freedom of the will.<sup>45</sup> Then Catherine of Genoa argued for the value in separating out a true self from false self, and emphasizing the need for self-knowledge, self-governance, and the practice of a life of virtue.<sup>46</sup> All of these writers serve as counter-examples to the attitude of sex polarity that women's rationality is without authority in its discursive functions.

In addition to defending an equality in the exercise of the rational faculty in men and women, we also discover in these writers the argument that some of the data which woman's reason considers is different in some significant respects from that of men. Women writers articulated many examples of uniquely feminine experience within their own culture. Mechtild of Hackeborn elaborated many sense based transcendental analogies in her works using such concepts as birthing, kitchens, and the spinning wheel.<sup>47</sup> Briget of Sweden articulated analogies based in sense data from the household and its many components of food, tools, and spaces. Teresa of Avila introduced sense based analogies of a castle and watering a garden. What we find in these examples is a hint of women discovering a unique feminine culture in their experience, and then elaborating the philosophical and theological meaning of these sense based experiences through the exercise of their discursive reasoning. Therefore, in addition to the examples they provide of the authoritative exercise of their rational faculties, they also give evidence of an attention to some gender differentiated data of consciousness.

A basic claim about rationality in a sex complementarity model is that women and men have the same structure of rationality, but that the content of this structure differs in some significant respects. Another way to express this would be to say that their faculties of intellect and will are similar but that the data considered is sometimes different. This difference is found in memories and data of the senses, in the lived experience of the body, in the experience being brought up male or female in a particular culture, in historical inheritance of masculine and feminine characteristics through gender specific history, language, archetypes, cultural stereotypes, or family patterns, and in different present experiences in society as a woman or as a man.

Philosophical foundations for a fractional form of sex complementarity were articulated by John Stuart Mill in his classic text, *The Subjection of Woman*. "With equality of experience and of general faculties, a woman usually sees much more than a man of what is immediately before her. Now this sensibility to the present, is the main quality on which the capacity for practice, as distinguished from theory, depends...Women's thoughts are thus as useful in giving reality to those of thinking men, as men's thoughts in giving width and largeness to those of women."<sup>48</sup> Virginia Woolf, elaborates a framework within which complementarity is necessary: "For there is a spot the size of a shilling at the back of the head which one can never see for oneself. It is one of the good offices that sex can discharge for sex- to describe that spot the size of a shilling at the back of the head."<sup>49</sup> Perhaps it is not surprising that historical contexts of dialogue among women and men have often been concomitant with the development of a philosophy of sex complementarity.<sup>50</sup>

There are also some recent writers who have suggested a theory of complementarity. With respect to the theme of rationality, this translates into identifying women with intuition and emotions, and men with discursive reasoning. Identifying an 'eternal feminine' in women or an 'essential femininity' also expressed this tendency. We find examples of this sort of approach in Teilhard de Chardin, Gertrude von Fort, and Rhonda Chervin.<sup>51</sup> All of the examples of sex complementarity mentioned so far participate in a fractional model of complementarity. In other words, they suggest that men or women provide a fraction of the whole range of rationality. This approach seems to me to contain an error of confusing the data of consciousness (which may be gender differentiated) with the rational faculties which are not themselves gender differentiated by nature, but which may become so through education. I would argue that the faculties themselves are not different, but that the data integrated by the faculties differ in some respects.

Edith Stein is a philosopher who tried to move a theory of gender beyond the fractional model. Stein argued within the framework of an inherent equality of men and women, that there is a difference in the way the soul and body are integrated which leads to a difference in natural tendencies towards a particular kind of way of interacting with the world.<sup>52</sup> However, she is quick to point out that these differences in integration and natural tendencies are not ultimately limiting, and that a person can learn the opposite characteristics through education. So for Stein a woman begins with a natural relation to feminine structure of rationality and learns the masculine structure, while a man begins with a natural relation to a masculine structure and learns the feminine structure. Her examples of gender differentiated rational characteristics include the following. The feminine structure 1) receives the world inwardly through the

emotions and is more affected inwardly by the lived experience of the body which is oriented towards supporting growth of new life within, 2) rationally judges the world received inwardly through the comprehension of a value of an existent in its totality, and 3) emphasizes personal and holistic choices. The masculine structure 1) receives the world through the intellect and is less affected by the lived experience of the body which is oriented towards reproducing by the detachment of seed, 2) rationally judges the world received intellectually in a compartmentalized way, and 3) emphasizes exterior, specialized choices.<sup>53</sup>

It is interesting to note that many contemporary feminist writers make similar claims to Stein's. For example, in an article entitled "Is Gender a Variable in Conceptions of Rationality" by Sandra Harding, the argument is made that sex was thought to be "a variable in the *distribution* of rationality," but that gender reveals different "*conceptions* of rationality."<sup>54</sup> Harding argues that for men, a rational person prefers separation from others, autonomy, taking the role of a generalized other, and seeks a firm gender identity. In contrast, for women a rational person seeks to empathize and connect with others, taking the role of a particularized other, and not paying much attention to a firm gender identity.<sup>55</sup> She concludes: "No wonder women's relational rationality appears to men immature, subhuman, and threatening. No wonder men's objectifying rationality appears to women alien, inhuman, and frightening."<sup>56</sup>

My own approach is to argue that the faculties, and soul-body relation are more similar in men and women, than Stein or Harding suggest. However, there is a gender differentiated aspect to experience which is significant for dialogue. I base my views on a theory of integral personal identity that has been articulated by such thinkers as Emmanuel Mounier, Hans Urs Van Balthasar, M.A. Krapiec, and Pope John Paul II.<sup>57</sup> It is interesting to note, that all of

these philosophers, as well as Edith Stein, develop from a renewed Aristotelian and Scholastic foundation which places a priority on the integration of the material, rational, and spiritual aspects of the individual human being in acts of existence. According to this model of integral complementarity, men and women have the same rational capacities, but the data used by these faculties differ in some gender related respects. Therefore, their participation in rational based communities will have different starting points and different results.

A second difference between fractional complementarity and integral complementarity is the priority that is given to the person in the latter theory. Fractional sex complementarity, particularly with respect to rationality, argues that a man and a woman together make a single rational person. Examples already cited make the claim that a woman might provide intuition, a man discursive reasoning, or a woman provide a concentration on the concrete present, and a man on the more distant past and future, and so forth. Integral complementarity, on the other hand, argues that each man and each woman provides the complete range of rational functions but that their exercise of rationality brings a difference to dialogue because of their different gendered identity. While Edith Stein's theory begins to move from a fractional to an integral model of complementarity, it seems to place a gender limit on the natural starting point for the exercise of the rational faculties by claiming that the relation of soul to body is different for men than it is for women.

A further important area to consider is the relation of a theory of sex and gender identity and the place of dialogue within a particular tradition. For example, within the traditional sex polarity tradition, in which women's rationality was devalued, dialogue among women and men did not occur. Women were excluded from the Peripatetic schools and from the western

universities which incorporated Aristotelian curriculum beginning in the thirteenth century. Within the tradition of Platonic and Cartesian sex unity, in which differences between men's and women's rationality were devalued, women were present in discussions with men, but their presence made no difference in the content of the dialogues because of the irrelevance of sex and gender. It is only within the tradition of sex complementarity that women and men entered into dialogue on a basis of fundamental equality and at the same time with an element of significant difference. Within the fractional model of complementarity, women and men provide only a fraction of the various faculties of a whole single human rationality, while within the integral model, men and women who are understood to have individually the full range of the exercise of rational faculties, but to bring to the conversations differences due to the sex and gender specific data they incorporate as a male or a female human being.

It would seem then that the epistemological crisis precipitated by the rejection of traditional sex polarity, and accompanied by forceful arguments for reverse sex polarity or sex unity, could be met by a model of integral sex complementarity.



## Notes

1. The concept of rationality, as a shared tradition of enquiry in Alasdair MacIntyre's sense in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) is used as a basis for my argument. However, the phrase "Which Rationality?" would more appropriately read "Whose Rationality?" in a consideration of the relation of rationality and gender.

2. MacIntyre, *Whose Justice?*, 355. MacIntyre identifies three stages in the development of a tradition: in the first stage, relevant beliefs, texts, and authorities are stated, but not yet put into question; in the second stage, inadequacies of theories in the first stage are identified, causing an 'epistemological crisis;' then in the third stage, reformulations of the original theories are developed as a response to the crisis.

3. MacIntyre, *Whose Justice?*, 394. I am assuming that the American Catholic Philosophical Association shares a common "practice-based community" delineated by the Apostle's and Nicene Creeds, recently renewed by Vatican II, and inspired by the *Encyclicals* and *Apostolic Letters* of its Pope and Magisterium.

4. Aristotle, *Politics* 1260a 1-5.

5. Lynda Lange, "Woman is not a Rational Animal: on Aristotle's Biology of Reproduction," *Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and the Philosophy of Science*, Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka, eds (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 1-16.

6. Albert the Great, *Quaestiones Super de Animalibus*, in *Opera Omnia*, Borgnet, ed. (Paris: Apud Ludovicum Vives, 1890-99), Book V, Quest. 4 and 6, Book XV, Quest 11, and *Politicorum*, in *Opera Omnia*, Book 9 a.

7. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1948), 1a, 92, 1.

8. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 2a, 2ae, 45, 2. For examples of how sex polarity pervaded medieval thought see, Sr. Prudence Allen, RSM, *The Concept of Woman: The Aristotelian Revolution (750BC-1250AD)* (Montreal and London: Eden Press, 1985).

9. Giles of Rome, *LI Livres du Gouvernement des Rois- Egidio Colonna's Treatise 'De Regimine Principum'*, trans and ed. Samuel Paul Molenaer (New York: AMS Press, 1975), folio 46, 183.

10. Genevieve Lloyd, "The Man of Reason," *Metaphilosophy* Vol.10, no.1 (January 1979), 18.

11. Genevieve Lloyd, *The Man of Reason: Male and Female in Western Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). See also, "Reason, Gender, and Morality in The History of Philosophy, Social Research, Vol. 50, no.3 (Autumn 1983) 490-513; and "The Divided Soul: Manliness and Effeminacy", *Contemporary Classics in Philosophy of Religion* eds. Ann Loades and Loyal D. Rue, (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1991), 401-420.

12. Lorainne Code, *What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991), 212. She criticizes the "reason/emotion" dichotomy "by which knowledge is distinguished from aspects of experience deemed to trivial, too particular, for epistemological notice." 29

13. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile* (London and Melbourne: Dent, 1984). "Consult the women's opinions in bodily matters, in all that concerns the senses; consult the men in matters of morality and all that concerns the understanding." 306. See where Rousseau elaborates the theory that the woman has a practical sense while men provide the rational and theoretical framework. "This relation produces a moral person of which the woman is the eye and man the hand, but the two are so dependent upon one another that the man teaches the woman what to see, and she teaches him what to do." 340.

14. Immanuel Kant, *On the Beautiful and the Sublime*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), Section III "Of the Distinction of the Beautiful and Sublime in the Interrelations of the Two Sexes," 79.

15. Arthur Schopenhauer, "On Women," in *Essays and Aphorisms* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970). "As a result of their weaker reasoning power women are as a rule far more affected by what is present, visible and immediately real than they are by abstract ideas, standing maxims, previous decisions or in general by regard for what is far off, in the past or still to come," 83

16. Both of these philosophers argue that a woman has a different relation from a man to the ethical or practical intellect. See, G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1967) especially sections: "the ethical world: law divine and human: man and woman;" and "ethical action: knowledge human and divine: guilt and destiny," 462-500. See also, Soren Kierkegaard, *Stages on Life's Way* (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), 61, 88, 98, 107, 163 and 280; or *Either/Or* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), I: 386, 424, and II: 316, and 319.

17. Otto Weininger, *Sex and Character*, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1975), 100. (a reprint of the 1906 edition).

18. Henry Cornelius Agrippa, *On the Superiority of Woman over Man* (New York: American News Company, 1873) 1-24. This was published originally 20 years after its composition in 1509.

19. Lucrezia Marinelli, *La Nobiltà et l'Eccellenza della Donne co'Diffetti et Mancamenti de gli Huomini* (Venice: Gio. Batista Ciotti Sansese, 1601). For example, "...speculation is as proper to a woman as it is for a man, but man does not allow a woman to spend time for such contemplation fearing, with reason, her superiority. Similarly I deny that womanly prudence consists only in being obedient to her husband because Aristotle defines prudence, as 'he who knows how to counsel to chose what is best regarding future things,' but who can deny that there have been many women in military government and also in government during peace, and that they have been very, very prudent? 127-8. Translated by Filippo Salvatore. Agrippa and Marinelli were both part of, but marginal to, the Catholic tradition.

20. Three excellent articles which trace the development and basic premises of these kinds of arguments are the following: Mary E Hawkesworth, "Feminist Epistemology: A Survey of the Field," *Women and Politics*, Vol. 7. (Fall 1987), 115-127; Susan Hekman, "The Feminization of Epistemology: Gender and the Social Sciences," *Women and Politics*, Vol. 7 (Fall 1987), 65-83; and John Chandler, "Feminism and Epistemology," *Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (October 1990), 367-381.

21. Alison M. Jaggar, "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology," *Inquiry*, Vol 32 (1988), 151-176. See also Miranda Fricker, "Reason and Emotion," *Radical Philosophy*, Vol. 57 (Spring 1991), 14-19.

22. Carole Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).

23. See Susan Moller Okin, "Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice," *Ethics*, Vol. 99 (January 1989), 229-249 and see Georgia Warnke, "Feminism and Hermeneutics," *Hypatia*, Vol. 8, no. 1 (Winter 1993), 81-98 for a consideration of Okin and MacIntyre on this issue.

24. Plato, *Republic* 455e-456a. The often quoted passage in *Timaeus* 69e-70a, comparing reason and irrationality with men's and women's quarters, does not seem to imply a difference in men and women, but rather in their living arrangements.

25. His claim in *Republic* 619e-620d and *Timaeus* 90e-91a that women are immoral or cowardly men in the past life is consistent with the view that women are weaker, but generally they have the same rational capacity. It may just take a little longer to educate them because of their weakness. See *Laws* 770d and 781a-c.

26. *Phaedrus* 67d and *Symposium* 201d-e.

27. Porphyry, *The Philosopher to His Wife, Marcella* (London: George Redway, 1896), (33), 77-8. The quote includes also the following: "Flee all that is womanish in thy soul, as though thou hadst a man's body about thee...I earnestly beg thee to keep firm hold upon philosophy." See also, (5), 57.

28. Anna Maria von Schurman, *The Learned Maid: Or, Whether a Maid may be a Scholar? A Logic Exercise* (London: John Redmayne, 1659).

29. François Poullain de La Barre, *The Woman as Good as the Man: Or, the Equality of Both Sexes* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988), 114.

30. Hilda Smith, *Reason's Disciples: Seventeenth Century English Feminists* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983). For the development of the same theme in Enlightenment science see Londa Schiebinger, *The Mind Has No Sex: Women in the Origins of Modern Science* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). It is interesting to note as well that Kant's close friend, Theodor Gottlieb von Hippel, took a Cartesian sex unity approach rather than a sex polarity approach to women in *On Improving the Status of Women* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1979).

31. Mary Astell, *A Serious Proposal to the Ladies for the Advancement of their True and Greatest Interest* (New York: Source Book Press, 1970) 18. Astell formulated a Cartesian model of education which began with "clear and distinct ideas" and then moved to conclusions based on the exercise of discursive reason, derived from principals, 73. In *An Essay in Defence of the Female Sex* (New York: Source Book Press, 1970) which is attributed to Astell, she argues that there is no distinction such as male and female souls, and that women's rational faculties have the same structure and function as men's. 32-3.

32. Olympe de Gouges, "Les Droits de la Femme", *Women in Revolutionary Paris 1789-95: Selected Documents with Notes and Commentary* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979) 88 and 90.

33. Mary Wollstonecraft, *A Vindication of the Rights of Women* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1975), 5. An example of Wollstonecraft's sex unity is found in the following passage: "I still insist, that not only the virtue but the knowledge of the two sexes considered not only as moral, but rational creatures, ought to endeavour to acquire human virtues (or perfections) by the same means as men, instead of being educated like a fanciful kind of half being- one of Rousseau's wild chimeras." 39. She also argues against Rousseau's "giving a sex to mind." 42.

34. Marie Jean Antoine Marquis de Condorcet, *Researche Historiques et Politiques sur Les Etats-unis de L'Amérique septentrionale*, avec quatre Lettres d'un Bourgeois de New haven sur l'unité de la législation (Paris: A Colle, 1788), 280-1.

35. Code, 132. She suggests a move away from a Cartesian model towards a cooperative interdependent model of as found in Kuhn or Bernstein. This model appears to follow not the masculine (Cartesian) ideal of autonomy and separateness, but rather what she calls a feminine model of connectedness. 135-7. For a further discussion of the relation of philosophers such as Rousseau and Hegel to the relation of the dichotomies reason/emotion and reason/intuition to gender see, Carol McMillan, *Women, Reason and Nature: Some Philosophical Problems with Feminism* (Princeton: University Press, 1982), chapters 1-3 and 5. An article that gives a good summary of different theories of rationality with special emphasis on Carol McMillan is: Robert Pargetter and Elizabeth W. Prior, "Against the Sexuality of Reason," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, Supplement to Vol. 64 (1986): 107-119.

36. Susan Bordo, "The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, vol 11, no 3 (1986): 439-456 and *The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture* (Buffalo: State University of New York Press, 1990). She admits to borrowing this idea from Karl Stern, *Flight from Woman* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1965).

37. Bordo, *Flight*, 118. See the Symposium about Bordo's characterization of the maleness of post-Cartesian philosophy in articles by Ann Garry, Judith Butler, Linda Fisher, Jane Upin, and Susan Bernick, and Susan Bordo's response in *Hypatia* Vol 7, no.3 (Summer 1992) 155-207. Bordo reasserts her main premise: "My argument is that philosophy only became "masculinized" (and along very specific lines) in the modern era." 203.

38. Janet Radcliffe Richards, *The Sceptical Feminist a philosophical enquiry* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 12-20.

39. Richards, 23.

40. Hildegard of Bingen, *Heilkunde: das Buch von den Grund und Wesen un der Heilung der Krankheiten (Causae et curae)* (Salzburg: O. Müller Verlag, 1972), 140.

41. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, (New York: Humanities Press, 1962).

42. *Hadewijch: The Complete Works*, Mother Columba Hart, ed. (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), 196-9.

43. *The Revelations of Mechtild of Magdeburg*, (London, New York, Toronto: Lonemans, Green, and Co. 1952).

44. *Brigitta of Sweden: Life and Selected Revelations* (New York and Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1990), 102-134.

45. Julian of Norwich, *Showings* (New York, Ramsey, Toronto: Paulist Press, 1978).

46. Catherine of Genoa, *Purgation and Purgatory, The Spiritual Dialogue* (New York, Ramasy, Toronto: Paulist Press, 1979).

47. *Le Livre de la Grace Spéciale: Révelations de Sainte Mechtilde vierge de l'ordre de Saint-Benoit* (Tours: Maison Mame, 1920).

48. John Stuart Mill, *The Subject of Woman* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972), 58-9.

49. *A Room of One's Own* (New York: Harvest, 1957), 94. At times Woolf appears to argue for an androgyny rather than complementarity. See, "...it made me also ask whether there are two sexes in the mind corresponding to the two sexes in the body, and whether they also require to be united in order to get complete satisfaction and happiness. And I went on amateurishly to sketch a plan of the soul so that in each of us two powers preside, one male, one female; and in the man's brain, the man predominates over the woman, and in the woman's brain, the woman predominates over the man. The normal and comfortable state of being is that when the two live in harmony together, spiritually cooperating." 102.

50. For example, Hildegard lived in the context of the double-monastery of men and women and John Stuart Mill worked out his theory together with Harriet Taylor.

51. Gertrud von le Fort, *The Eternal Woman: The Woman in Time/Timeless Woman* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1962). le Fort emphasizes that woman's primary intellectual characteristic is surrender to the species, while man's is found in performing as an individual. She concludes: "her endowment them appears as equal to that of the man; but it is not for the woman herself, it is for the generation." 17. Teilhard de Chardin, *The Heart of Matter* (London: Collins, 1978) suggests that the main characteristic is 'the power of attraction.' See, "The Feminine, or The Unitive," 58-61 where he considers what he calls the "fundamental complementarity of the encounter of the sexes. This aspect of Teilhard's theory is developed extensively by Henri de Lubac in *The Eternal Feminine: A Study on the Poem by Teilhard de Chardin* (London: Collins, 1971). Teilhard's poem is contained in the original French version in *L'éternel féminin* (Paris: Aubier, 1983), 11-22. Rhonda Chervin, *Feminine, Free, and Faithful* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986) differentiations quality complementarity from role complementarity, 45-50.

52. Stein, "Problems of Women's Education," in *Essays on Women* (Washington DC: ICS Publications, 1987), 177-8. The relationship of soul and body is different in man and woman; the relation of soul to body differs in their psychic life as well as that of the spiritual faculties to each other. The feminine [female human] species expresses a unity and wholeness of the total psychosomatic personality and a harmonious development of faculties. The masculine [male human] species strives to enhance individual abilities in order that they may attain their highest achievements."

53. Edith Stein, *Essays on Women*, 42-3, 48-9, 81, 106, 112-3, 148, 207, 247-8, 256-7. These views are paraphrased in Prudence Allen, "Sex and Gender Differentiation in Hildegard of Bingen and Edith Stein," *Communio* 20 (Summer, 1993), 397.

54. Sandra Harding, "Is Gender a Variable in Conceptions of Rationality? A survey of Issues," *Dialectica*, Vol.36, no 2-3 (1982), 226-7.

55. Harding, 235.

56. Harding, 235-6. She concludes her article: "there is a growing body of evidence supporting the claim that gender is a variable in conceptions of rationality." 240.

57. Emmanuel Mounier, "La Femme aussi est une personne." *Esprit*, (June 1936), 291-7; for an excellent discussion of Balthasaar's theories see, David Schindler, "Catholic Theology, gender, and the future of Western Civilization," *Communio* 20 (Summer, 1993), 200-239; Pope John Paul II, *Original Unity of Man and Woman: Catechesis on the Book of Genesis* (Boston: St. Paul Editions, 1981) and *On The Dignity and Vocation of Woman* (Boston: St. Paul Books, 1988); and Prudence Allen, "Integral Sex Complementarity and the Theology of Communion," *Communio* 17 (Winter, 1990), 523-44.